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The NCAA’s Restitution Rule:  
Bulwark Against Cheating or Barrier 
to Appropriate Legal Remedies? 
  Brian L. Porto* 
INTRODUCTION 
The overarching question posed by this Symposium is 
whether courts or some other independent body should review the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (“NCAA” or the 
“Association”) “enforcement actions,” namely decisions that punish 
alleged rule violations by individuals and institutions.  Typically, 
when journalists and scholars refer to NCAA enforcement they 
mean the process conducted by the Association’s Committee on 
Infractions (“COI”) and Infractions Appeals Committee (“IAC”), 
respectively, in which the accused parties are institutions and 
their employees.1  This process, which can result in coaches and 
other institutional employees losing their jobs and college athletic 
programs incurring significant penalties, has long been the 
subject of criticism by journalists and academics for failing to treat 
accused parties fairly.2 
But NCAA enforcement also encompasses decisions 
 
* Professor, Vermont Law School.  J.D., Indiana University (Bloomington), 
1987; Ph.D. (Political Science), Miami University (Ohio), 1979; B.A., 
University of Rhode Island, 1974. 
 1.  See generally Brian L. Porto, New Rules for an Old Game: Recent 
Changes to the NCAA Enforcement Process and Some Suggestions for the 
Future, 92 OR. L. REV. 1057 (2014). 
 2.  See, eg., id.  I have been one of the critics of the NCAA’s enforcement 
process, most extensively in BRIAN L. PORTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
NCAA: THE CASE FOR LESS COMMERCIALISM AND MORE DUE PROCESS IN 
COLLEGE SPORTS (2012). 
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concerning the eligibility of individual athletes to compete, 
particularly decisions of the Committee on Student-Athlete 
Reinstatement (“Reinstatement Committee”), which hears appeals 
by institutions seeking the restoration of competitive eligibility for 
athletes previously declared ineligible.3  The NCAA requires 
member institutions to certify the eligibility of their athletes4 and 
to withhold from competition those athletes determined to be 
ineligible for academic, disciplinary, or other reasons consistent 
with the Association’s bylaws.5  If the athlete is to be reinstated, 
the institution, after having withheld him or her from competition, 
must conclude that “the circumstances warrant restoration of 
eligibility” and then appeal, on the athlete’s behalf, to the 
Reinstatement Committee.6 
Concerning individual eligibility decisions, NCAA Bylaw 
19.13, the Restitution Rule, which is the subject of this Article, 
looms large for athletes and institutions alike.  If the 
Reinstatement Committee denies the request to restore eligibility, 
the Restitution Rule will make the athlete think twice about 
seeking redress in court.  The rule provides that if an athlete 
obtains an injunction from a trial court preventing the NCAA from 
keeping him or her off the field or court, but then an appellate 
court reverses the injunction, the NCAA may extend the period of 
ineligibility and punish the athlete’s institution retroactively for 
letting the athlete compete while the injunction was in effect.7  
The best evidence of the Restitution Rule’s power as a deterrent to 
college athletes seeking injunctions is that, although the rule has 
been in effect since 1975, the NCAA has only invoked it once.8  
Because of the Restitution Rule, trial courts have been reluctant 
to grant injunctions in eligibility disputes, and universities have 
told athletes they will not honor an injunction granted by a trial 
court for fear that its subsequent reversal on appeal would trigger 
severe penalties from the NCAA.9 
 
 3.  See NCAA, 2014–15 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12.12.1, at 85 
(2014), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/ 
D115.pdf [hereinafter D-1 MANUAL]. 
 4.  Id. art. 12.10.1, at 84. 
 5.  Id. art. 12.11.1, at 85. 
 6.  Id. art. 12.12.1, at 85. 
 7.  Id. art. 19.13, at 329–30.  
 8.  See Shelton v. NCAA, 539 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 9.  See infra Part II.B, note 81.  
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Not surprisingly, in light of its power to blunt the effect of a 
court order, the Restitution Rule is controversial.  It is criticized 
for interfering with judicial power by denying athletes access to 
the courts, or at least discouraging them from seeking judicial 
relief, and for spurring institutions to disregard injunctions 
favoring athletes for fear of being punished by the NCAA if the 
injunction is vacated on appeal.10  On the other hand, some defend 
the rule because it discourages institutions from using ineligible 
players by ensuring that institutions are punished for doing so.11  
The clash of viewpoints raises the question whether the 
Restitution Rule is worth preserving to prevent institutions from 
seeking a competitive advantage by using ineligible players, or 
instead, is an impediment to fairness that should be eliminated.  
This Article argues that although the Restitution Rule serves 
legitimate goals, these goals can still be achieved with judicial 
authority remaining intact by submitting NCAA eligibility 
disputes to binding arbitration, thereby eliminating the need for 
the Restitution Rule. 
Part I of this Article discusses the origins and principal 
features of the Restitution Rule.  Part II explains how the rule 
operates in practice and the arguments both for and against it.  
Part III addresses the traditional reluctance of courts to intervene 
in the operations of private associations, which accounts for the 
continued viability of the rule.  Part IV presents alternative 
proposals for supplanting the rule, although it emphasizes binding 
arbitration as the best means of doing so.  Part V concludes that 
binding arbitration should be the exclusive method of resolving 
disputes between institutions and the NCAA regarding an 
athlete’s eligibility for competition. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESTITUTION RULE 
A. Provisions and Consequences 
The Restitution Rule is codified in NCAA Bylaw 19.13.12  It 
states as follows: 
If a student-athlete who is ineligible under the terms of 
 
 10.  See infra Part I. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 19.13, at 329–30. 
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the constitution, bylaws or other legislation of the 
Association is permitted to participate in intercollegiate 
competition contrary to such NCAA legislation but in 
accordance with the terms of a court restraining order or 
injunction operative against the institution attended by 
such student-athlete or against the Association, or both, 
and said injunction is voluntarily vacated, stayed or 
reversed or it is finally determined by the courts that 
injunctive relief is not or was not justified, the Board of 
Directors may take any one or more of the following 
actions against such institution in the interest of 
restitution and fairness to competing institutions: 
(a) Require that [the athlete’s] individual records 
and performances achieved during participation by 
such ineligible student-athlete shall be vacated or 
stricken; 
(b) Require that team records and performances 
achieved during participation by such ineligible 
student-athlete shall be vacated or stricken; 
(c) Require that team victories achieved during 
participation by such ineligible student-athlete shall 
be abrogated and the games or events forfeited to the 
opposing institutions; 
(d) Require that individual awards earned during 
participation by such ineligible student-athlete shall 
be returned to the Association, the sponsor or the 
competing institution supplying same; 
(e) Require that team awards earned during 
participation by such ineligible student-athlete shall 
be returned to the Association, the sponsor or the 
competing institution supplying same; 
(f) Determine that the institution is ineligible for 
one or more NCAA championships in the sports and 
in the seasons in which such ineligible student-
athlete participated; 
(g) Determine that the institution is ineligible for 
invitational and postseason meets and tournaments 
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in the sports and in the seasons in which such 
ineligible student-athlete participated; 
(h) Require that the institution shall remit to the 
NCAA the institution’s share of television receipts 
(other than the portion shared with other conference 
members) for appearing on any live television series 
or program if such ineligible student-athlete 
participates in the contest(s) selected for such 
telecast, or if the Board of Directors concludes that 
the institution would not have been selected for such 
telecast but for the participation of such ineligible 
student-athlete during the season of the telecast; any 
such funds thus remitted shall be devoted to the 
NCAA postgraduate scholarship program; and 
(i) Require that the institution that has been 
represented in an NCAA championship by such a 
student-athlete shall be assessed a financial penalty 
as determined by the Committee on Infractions.13 
Thus, the Restitution Rule can have adverse consequences for 
individual athletes, teams, and institutions.  Athletes can see 
their individual records erased, and teams can see their 
championship seasons eviscerated and their eligibility for future 
championships taken from them.14  Most importantly, in the 
money-centered world of big-time college sports, institutions can 
be denied future financial rewards by being barred from upcoming 
championships and can be forced to pay financial penalties for the 
past participation of an ineligible player, even when a then-valid 
court order authorized that participation.15 
B. Defenders and Detractors 
Despite its potentially severe consequences for individuals 
and institutions, the Restitution Rule has been the subject of 
scant litigation and academic commentary.16  Perhaps that is 
 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. art. 19.13(a)–(c), at 330. 
 15.  Id. art. 19.13(f)–(h), at 330. 
 16.  The cases in which the NCAA’s Restitution Rule has figured most 
prominently are National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77 
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because the NCAA has used the rule only once since its adoption 
in 1975.17  In the spring of 1976, the Association invoked the rule 
against Oregon State University following a reversal by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of a 
preliminary injunction issued previously by a federal district 
court.18  The case involved Lonnie Shelton, a standout basketball 
player at Oregon State, who had forfeited his amateur status by 
signing a professional basketball contract in June 1975.19  The 
University declared Shelton ineligible before the start of the 1975–
76 college season, but he played anyway, thanks to the district 
court’s order.20  The NCAA appealed, and the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court.21  Thereafter, the NCAA invoked the 
Restitution Rule and required Oregon State to vacate all of the 
individual records and performances Shelton achieved (and his 
team’s record) during his ineligibility.22 
According to one commentator, the use of the Restitution Rule 
just once in four decades is a testament to its effectiveness at 
“curtailing [NCAA] members’ and college athletes’ injunctive 
claims, and the success of those claims, against the NCAA.”23  The 
rule has achieved its drafters’ aim—to stem the rising tide of 
lawsuits being filed against the NCAA in the 1970s, which had 
increased in number from two to twenty-five between 1971 and 
1974.24  The drafters were especially eager to deter athletes’ 
 
(Ky. 2001) and Oliver v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 920 N.E.2d 203 
(Ohio C.P. 2009).  In the latter, an Ohio trial court invalidated the 
Restitution Rule as violating the plaintiff’s constitutional right of access to 
the courts, but a subsequent settlement by the parties negated that decision, 
thereby preserving the rule.  Oliver, 920 N.E.2d 203, vacated pursuant to 
settlement (Sept. 30, 2009).  For scholarly commentary on the rule, see 
Richard G. Johnson, Submarining Due Process: How the NCAA Uses Its 
Restitution Rule to Deprive College Athletes of Their Right of Access to the 
Court . . . Until Oliver v. NCAA, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 459 (2010) and 
Stephen F. Ross et al., Judicial Review of NCAA Eligibility Decisions: 
Evaluation of the Restitution Rule and a Call for Arbitration, 40 J.C. & U.L. 
79 (2014). 
 17.  See Johnson, supra note 16, at 504. 
 18.  Shelton v. NCAA, 539 F.2d 1197, 1199 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 19.  Id. at 1198; see also Johnson, supra note 16, at 504. 
 20.  See Johnson, supra note 16, at 504–05. 
 21.  Shelton, 539 F.2d at 1199. 
 22.  Johnson, supra note 16, at 505.  
 23.  Id. at 520. 
 24.  See id. at 474. 
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requests for injunctive relief, namely temporary restraining orders 
and preliminary injunctions.25  They have succeeded in 
spectacular fashion. 
Still, the Restitution Rule is limited in its reach.  It applies 
only to eligibility disputes involving individual athletes, not to 
NCAA enforcement proceedings against institutions or athletic 
department employees.26  And it is connected to a larger 
enterprise: the work of the Reinstatement Committee, which is in 
charge of reinstating eligible athletes previously declared 
ineligible for having violated Association rules.27  Under NCAA 
bylaws, an ineligible athlete may seek restoration of eligibility, 
provided the athlete’s institution is willing to appeal to the 
Reinstatement Committee on his or her behalf.28  Frequently, 
time is of the essence regarding these types of requests because 
the athlete is seeking to have eligibility restored for a fast-
approaching game, meet, or tournament.29 
The Reinstatement Committee delegates to the NCAA’s 
reinstatement staff the initial authority to process requests for 
restoration of eligibility—subject to guidelines established by the 
committee—and with a provision for the committee to hear 
appeals from the staff’s decision.30  Neither the staff nor the 
committee conducts an investigation or engages in independent 
fact-finding; rather, each body evaluates the athlete’s 
responsibility for the rule violation based on information the 
institution provides and, in turn, decides whether the athlete’s 
eligibility may be restored and, if so, how restoration should 
occur.31  An athlete would be most likely to seek a temporary 
restraining order or a preliminary injunction permitting a return 
 
 25.  See id. at 477. 
 26.  See D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 19.13, 329–30.  Indeed, the 
Restitution Rule is contained in just one article, 19.13, within the larger 
entity, Bylaw 19, which encompasses the NCAA’s entire enforcement 
program. 
 27.  See Josephine R. Potuto, The NCAA Rules Adoption, Interpretation, 
Enforcement, and Infractions Processes: The Laws That Regulate Them and 
the Nature of Court Review, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 257, 261 (2010). 
 28.  D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12.12.1, at 85; see also id. art. 
12.11.1, at 85. 
 29.  PORTO, supra note 2, at 286. 
 30.  Id. at 285. 
 31.  Id. at 286. 
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to competition immediately after an unfavorable decision by the 
Reinstatement Committee.  If the trial court granted injunctive 
relief, the NCAA would presumably appeal, thereby enabling 
invocation of the Restitution Rule if the appellate court were to 
overturn the injunction.32 
Despite its capacity to blunt the impact of a court order and 
its potentially harsh consequences for individuals and institutions, 
the Restitution Rule has its defenders.  For example, in 2004, 
then-Tulane University law professor Gary Roberts testified about 
the rule to a Congressional subcommittee investigating the 
NCAA’s enforcement process.33  He stated as follows: 
If an institution were not subject to penalties in such a 
situation, coaches could recruit a number of ineligible 
players, seek short-term injunctions just before important 
contests from local judges who often act out of partisan or 
parochial interests, and then allow players to participate 
to the substantial competitive advantage of the team (and 
unfair disadvantage to its opponents), all without any 
fear of subsequent penalty when the appellate courts 
inevitably reverse the injunction.34 
But, the rule’s critics are equally outspoken.  For example, the 
Ohio trial court in Oliver v. NCAA, which struck down the rule 
before the parties’ settlement negated its decision, stated that 
“[t]he [NCAA] may title [then] Bylaw 19.7 ‘Restitution,’ but it is 
still punitive in its achievement, and it fosters a direct attack on 
the constitutional right of access to courts.”35  Later in its opinion, 
the Ohio court commented on the difficult choice the rule forced on 
institutions between honoring a court order, thereby facing NCAA 
penalties, or disregarding a court order to avoid such penalties.36  
The court wrote: 
Such a bylaw is governed by no fixed standard except 
that which is self-serving for the [NCAA].  To that extent, 
 
 32.  See D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 19.13, at 229–30.  
 33.  See Due Process and the NCAA: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 108th 
Cong. 15 (2004) (statement of Gary Roberts, Deputy Dean & Dir. of Sports 
Law, Tulane Law School). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  920 N.E.2d 203, 216 (Ohio C.P. 2009). 
 36.  Id. 
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it is arbitrary and indeed a violation of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing implicit in its contract with 
the plaintiff [athlete], as the third-party beneficiary [of 
the contract between the NCAA and the athlete’s 
institution].37 
Despite the clarity of the conflicting viewpoints expressed 
above, the best way to assess the merits and demerits of the 
Restitution Rule is to observe it in operation in the few cases in 
which it has played a role.  That is the focus of Part II, which 
follows. 
II. THE RESTITUTION RULE IN COURT 
A. NCAA v. Lasege 
The Restitution Rule figured prominently in National 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Lasege.38  In that case, the 
Reinstatement Committee upheld a finding by the reinstatement 
staff that a Nigerian citizen had violated NCAA rules by playing 
professional basketball in Russia before enrolling at the 
University of Louisville.39  Both NCAA entities concluded that the 
athlete’s violation of Association bylaws against professionalism, 
by accepting cash and other benefits in exchange for his basketball 
services, reflected a clear intent to become a professional, thereby 
rendering him ineligible for intercollegiate competition.40 
Mr. Lasege sought injunctive relief in a Kentucky trial court, 
which agreed with him that any violations of NCAA rules he 
committed occurred only to obtain a visa that would enable him to 
become a student in the United States, not a professional athlete 
in Russia.41  The trial court also invalidated the Restitution Rule, 
reasoning that it prevents parties from availing themselves of 
appropriate legal protections.42  The court’s injunction enabled 
Lasege to play for Louisville during the 2000–01 college basketball 
season.43 
 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  53 S.W.3d 77 (Ky. 2001). 
 39.  Id. at 80–81. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 81–82. 
 42.  Id. at 82. 
 43.  Id. 
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The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the injunction,44 but 
the Kentucky Supreme Court later vacated the injunction in its 
entirety, including the portion that prohibited the NCAA from 
invoking the Restitution Rule.45  Regarding the rule, the 
Kentucky Supreme Court observed: 
Perhaps the trial court believed that NCAA Bylaw 19.8 
[which housed the rule in 2001] would deter aggrieved 
student-athletes from seeking judicial redress because of 
fears that their efforts would only hurt their teams in the 
long run.  Perhaps the trial court believed that the bylaw 
created a disincentive for NCAA member institutions to 
allow players whose eligibility has not yet been finally 
adjudicated to play in games or other athletic events.46 
Noting the existence of comparable rules in high school 
sports, the Court continued: 
NCAA Bylaw 19.8, like the Restitution Rules enforced by 
many state high school athletic associations, ‘does not 
purport to authorize interference with any court order 
during the time it remains in effect, but only authorizes 
restitutive penalties when a temporary restraining order 
is ultimately dissolved and the challenged eligibility rule 
remains undisturbed in force.’47 
Accordingly, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that the 
Restitution Rule does not compromise judicial authority, but 
instead, “merely allows for post-hoc equalization when a trial 
court’s erroneously granted temporary injunction upsets 
competitive balance.”48 
B. Bloom v. NCAA 
1. The Litigation 
The Restitution Rule was not as prominent in the outcome of 
Bloom v. NCAA as it was in Lasege, but in Plaintiff Jeremy 
 
 44.  Id.   
 45.  Id. at 89. 
 46.  Id. at 88. 
 47.  Id. (quoting Cardinal Mooney High Sch. v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic 
Ass’n, 467 N.W.2d 21, 22 (1991)). 
 48.  Id. 
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Bloom’s mind, it was the 800-pound gorilla in the trial judge’s 
chambers that silently directed the judge to deny Bloom’s request 
for injunctive relief.49  In 2002, Jeremy Bloom faced a delicious 
dilemma.  Before enrolling that year at the University of Colorado, 
Bloom had competed in Olympic and World Cup skiing events and 
had become the World Cup Champion in freestyle moguls.50  
During the 2002 Olympics, he appeared on MTV and was offered 
various paid entertainment opportunities; he also agreed to 
endorse certain ski equipment and model Tommy Hilfiger 
clothing.51 
Bloom’s dilemma derived from his athletic versatility; besides 
being a world-class ski racer, he was a talented football player.52  
Bloom had relinquished his endorsement and media opportunities 
in order to be eligible for collegiate football because NCAA rules 
prohibited athletes from accepting endorsement income, even 
when that income came from a sport other than the one the 
athlete played in college.53  Acting on Bloom’s behalf, the 
University of Colorado first requested waivers of NCAA rules 
restricting endorsements and media activities by athletes and 
later sought a favorable interpretation of the rule on media 
activities, but the NCAA denied these requests.54  Accordingly, 
Bloom ceased his endorsement, modeling, and media activities to 
play football during the 2002 and 2003 seasons.55  In 2004, 
though, with the next Olympics approaching in two years, he 
 
 49.  Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 622 (Colo. App. 2004). 
 50.  Bloom, 93 P.3d at 622.  Freestyle, moguls skiing combines the bumpy 
terrain of moguls competition with the jumps, flips, and twists of freestyle 
events.  See Mogul skiing, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Mogul_skiing (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
 51.  Bloom, 93 P.3d at 622. 
 52.   Id. 
 53.  Id.   
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id.  Bloom’s exploits on the football field showed why the University 
of Colorado had sought a waiver of NCAA rules that would have allowed him 
to play football while earning endorsement income.  See Gordon Gouveia, 
Making a Mountain Out of a Mogul: Jeremy Bloom v. NCAA and Unjustified 
Denial of Compensation Under NCAA Amateurism Rules, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. 
& PRAC. 22, 22 (2005).  For example, as a freshman, he made an immediate 
impact on the Buffaloes’ gridiron fortunes with a 94-yard pass reception—the 
longest in school history—and an 80-yard punt return for a touchdown.  See 
id.  The punt return occurred against Oklahoma in the 2002 Big-12 
championship game.  See id. 
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resumed those activities in order to pay the expenses associated 
with his ski training.56  In an effort to remain eligible for football 
while engaged in commercial activities, he sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the NCAA in the Colorado courts.57 
Specifically, Bloom sought to enjoin the NCAA from punishing 
him for participating in those activities because: (1) he had 
pursued them before enrolling in college, and (2) they were 
entirely unrelated to his football prowess.58  The trial court denied 
his request, reasoning that although he was a third-party 
beneficiary of the NCAA’s contractual relationship with the 
University of Colorado (hence he had standing to challenge NCAA 
rules), his claims did not warrant a preliminary injunction under 
Colorado law.59  Such was the case because he satisfied only three 
parts of Colorado’s six-part test for preliminary injunctions; he 
could show: (1) a danger of real, immediate, and irreparable injury 
that may be prevented by injunctive relief; (2) the lack of a plain, 
speedy, and adequate remedy at law; and (3) the likelihood that 
an injunction would preserve the status quo pending a trial on the 
merits.60  But he could not show that: (4) he had a reasonable 
probability of success on the merits; (5) granting him an injunction 
would serve the public interest; and (6) the balance of equities 
favored granting the injunction.61 
Bloom appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed 
after reviewing his claims for breach of contract and arbitrary and 
 
 56.  Bloom, 93 P.3d at 622. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 623.  The third-party beneficiary rule drops contract law’s 
traditional privity requirement by permitting one who is not a party to a 
contract to enforce its terms nonetheless.  See Joel Eckert, Note, Student-
Athlete Contract Rights in the Aftermath of Bloom v. NCAA, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
905, 928 (2006) (citing RICHARD A. LORD, 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §  37:1 
(Jack K. Levin ed., 4th  ed. 2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 
304, 310 (1981)).  Third parties can thus enforce a contract to the same extent 
as a traditional party in privity if they are intended beneficiaries because the 
promisor has a duty to any intended beneficiaries to perform the promise.  
See id.  In most cases, the third-party beneficiary’s claim will be against the 
promisor.  See id.  Still, the promisee can be liable to the third-party 
beneficiary if the promisee is responsible for the breach, either jointly or 
individually.  See id.  
 60.  Bloom, 93 P.3d at 623.  
 61.  Id. 
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capricious action by the NCAA.62  Like the trial court, the 
appellate court agreed that Bloom was a third-party beneficiary of 
the NCAA’s contractual relationship with the University of 
Colorado, and therefore, he had standing to challenge the 
Association’s bylaws.63  Key to Bloom’s case was his reasoning 
that NCAA Bylaw 12.1.2 permitted a college student to be a 
professional in one sport, yet an amateur in his or her college 
sport.64  In Bloom’s view, because a professional athlete is simply 
one who “gets paid” for playing a sport, the NCAA should permit 
him to play college football while earning whatever income is 
“customary” in his sport, namely endorsement income.65 
The appellate court disagreed, observing that, although 
NCAA rules permitted one to play a college sport as an amateur 
while earning a salary from playing professionally in another 
sport, no NCAA bylaw identified a right to receive “customary 
income” for playing a sport.66  On the contrary, the court noted, 
NCAA Bylaw 12.5.2.1 specifically prohibited college athletes from 
receiving money for advertisements and endorsements.67 
In the court’s view, these bylaws taken together, show a 
clear . . . intent to prohibit student-athletes from 
engaging in endorsements . . . without regard to: (1) when 
the opportunity for such activities originated; (2) whether 
the opportunity arose or exists for reasons unrelated to 
participation in an amateur sport; and (3) whether 
 
 62.  Id. at 622, 623. 
 63.  Id. at 623–24. 
 64.  The current version of this rule is Bylaw 15.3.1.4, which states,  “[a] 
professional athlete in one sport may represent a member institution in a 
different sport and may receive institutional financial assistance in the 
second sport.”  D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.3.1.4, at 195. 
 65.  Bloom, 93 P.3d at 625. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id.  This bylaw is still in effect under the same number.  It states:  
After becoming a student-athlete, an individual shall not be eligible 
for participation in Intercollegiate athletics if the individual: 
(a) Accepts any remuneration for or permits the use of his or her 
name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the 
sale or use of a commercial product or service of any kind; or 
(b) Receives remuneration for endorsing a commercial product or 
service through the individual’s use of such product or service. 
D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12.5.2.1, at 71. 
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income derived from the opportunity is customary for any 
particular professional sport.68 
Therefore, although college athletes have the right to be 
professional athletes in other sports, “they do not have the right to 
simultaneously engage in endorsement or paid media activity and 
maintain their eligibility to participate in amateur competition.”69  
The court added that despite the disparate impact of Bylaws 
12.1.2 and 12.5.2.1 on, say, minor league baseball players, who 
earned salaries, and skiers, who earned only endorsement income, 
it could not ignore the clear language of those bylaws “simply 
because they may disproportionately affect those who participate 
in individual professional sports.”70 
Moreover, the court noted that the bylaws’ prohibition on 
income from endorsements and media activities was rationally 
related to the NCAA’s stated purpose of maintaining a “clear line 
of demarcation” between college and professional sports.71  
According to the court, permitting Mr. Bloom to endorse products 
and be paid for doing so could “open the door” to the commercial 
exploitation of athletes in other sports.72  Furthermore, permitting 
him to be paid for entertainment activities, such as hosting a 
television show, would make it difficult “to determine which of 
Bloom’s requested activities were, in fact, unrelated to his athletic 
ability,”73 which NCAA rules prohibited him from using to obtain 
commercial opportunities.74 
 
 68.  Bloom, 93 P.3d at 626.  
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. (quoting NCAA, 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12.01.2, 
at 59 (2013)).   
 72.  Id. at 627. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Under current Bylaw 12.5.1.3, a college athlete may continue 
modeling and other promotional activities unrelated to athletics begun before 
entering college if, among other criteria, “[t]he [athlete] became involved in 
such activities for reasons independent of athletics ability; . . . [and t]he 
[athlete] does not endorse the commercial product” involved.  D-1 MANUAL, 
supra note 3, art. 12.5.1.3(b),(d), at 69.  The Bloom court’s concern in this 
regard was that, although Mr. Bloom’s pre-college commercial ventures may 
have resulted only from his skiing prowess, any such activities in which he 
might engage during college could derive as much from his status as a college 
football player as from his skiing fame.  Bloom, 93 P.3d at 627.  In that case, 
it would be difficult to determine whether or not he was in violation of NCAA 
rules.  
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Finally, the court pointed out that Bloom had failed to show 
any arbitrariness or inconsistency in the way the NCAA applied 
its rules in his case or any unfair treatment in its denial of his 
request for a waiver of those rules.75  Thus, the court agreed with 
the trial court’s reasoning that he had not demonstrated a 
reasonable probability of success on the merits and affirmed the 
denial of his request for an injunction.76  Because it affirmed the 
trial court’s decision, the appellate court did not need to address 
the validity of the Restitution Rule.77 
2. The Aftermath: Bloom’s Congressional Testimony 
Jeremy Bloom certainly addressed the Restitution Rule in 
subsequent testimony before a congressional subcommittee.  In 
September 2004, Bloom told the subcommittee: 
In my experience, this restitution bylaw brought much 
concern to the [trial] judge who heard my case as well as 
spurred university officials to notify me that, even if I 
were granted injunctive relief by the court, that the 
university would not take the risk of allowing me to play 
for fear of possible sanctions.78 
To make his point, Bloom quoted the portion of the trial 
judge’s opinion that sought to determine whether granting the 
injunction would serve the public interest.79  Toward that end, the 
judge weighed the relative harms to Mr. Bloom and the University 
of Colorado that would result from a decision granting the 
injunction.80  The trial judge wrote: 
The harm to CU . . . would be that an injunction 
mandating that they declare Mr. Bloom eligible and allow 
him to compete on the football team would risk the 
imposition of sanctions pursuant to bylaw 19.8, which 
would allow the NCAA to impose sanctions if an 
injunction was erroneously granted.  These sanctions 
 
 75.  Bloom, 93 P.3d at 628. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Due Process and the NCAA Hearing, supra note 33, at 19 (statement 
of Jeremy Bloom). 
 79.  Id. at 22. 
 80.  Id. 
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could include: forfeiture of all victories, of all titles, TV 
revenue, as well as others; forfeiture of games would 
irreparably harm all of the members of the CU football 
team who would see their hard earned victories after 
great personal sacrifice nullified; the loss of revenues 
would harm all student athletes at CU who would find 
their various programs less economically viable; 
imposition of NCAA sanctions would harm CU’s 
reputation; and sanctions would reduce the 
competitiveness of various sports teams at CU.81 
After weighing the stakes for Bloom and the University, 
respectively, the trial judge added,  “I find that the harm to CU 
and the NCAA is more far reaching, especially because it could 
harm other student athletes, than the harm to Mr. Bloom.  
Therefore, the public interest would not be served by an 
injunction.”82 
Thus, although the Restitution Rule did not play a key role in 
the appellate court’s decision in Bloom v. NCAA, its likely 
consequences for the University of Colorado if an injunction had 
issued in Bloom’s favor nonetheless influenced the trial judge’s 
decision to deny Bloom’s request for an injunction.  The appellate 
court relied on the reasonableness of the NCAA’s prohibition on 
endorsements by athletes to resolve the case; nevertheless, its 
decision affirmed the denial of an injunction request that, if 
granted, could have unleashed the NCAA’s notion of “restitution” 
on the University of Colorado.83 
C. Oliver v. NCAA 
More recently, in Oliver v. NCAA, briefly addressed above, the 
Restitution Rule was front-and-center in an Ohio trial court’s 
decision to grant the college-athlete plaintiff’s request to enjoin 
the NCAA from keeping him off the baseball diamond.84  In May 
2008, the NCAA suspended Oklahoma State University pitcher 
Andy Oliver indefinitely for violating Bylaw 12.3.1, the “no-agent” 
rule, by: “(1) allowing his previous attorneys to contact the 
 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 627 (Colo. App. 2004). 
 84.  920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio C.P. 2009). 
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Minnesota Twins by telephone and (2) by allowing [one of those 
attorneys] to be present in [Oliver’s Ohio] home” when a Twins 
representative offered Oliver a contract.85  Oliver sued in Ohio, 
and the trial court issued a temporary restraining order 
reinstating him, after which Oklahoma State asked the NCAA to 
reinstate him.86  Instead of reinstating him, however, the NCAA 
suspended Oliver for one year and reduced his collegiate eligibility 
by a year.87 
On the merits of the case, the trial court attacked both the 
No-Agent Rule, which Oliver had allegedly violated, and the 
Restitution Rule, which would affect both Oliver and Oklahoma 
State if he obtained an injunction that was later overturned on 
appeal.  Regarding Oliver’s claim against the No-Agent Rule, the 
court first observed that Oliver, like Jeremy Bloom, was a third-
party beneficiary of his University’s contractual relationship with 
the NCAA, which entitled him to assert “a violation of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing that is implied in the contractual 
relationship between the NCAA and its members.”88  Therefore, 
the court continued, the NCAA “was required to deal honestly and 
reasonably with [Oliver] as a third-party beneficiary of its 
contractual relationship.”89  Yet the No-Agent Rule, which permits 
an athlete to hire a lawyer as an advisor, but prohibits the lawyer 
from contacting a professional team on the athlete’s behalf and 
from being present when a contract is offered, failed to satisfy 
those requirements.90  In the court’s view, the rule “is unreliable 
(capricious) and illogical (arbitrary) and indeed stifles what 
attorneys are trained and retained to do.”91 
The court reached a similar conclusion about the Restitution 
Rule, observing that it not only “fosters a direct attack on the 
constitutional right of access to courts,” but is also “arbitrary and 
indeed a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
implicit in [the NCAA’s] contract with [Oliver], as the third-party 
 
 85.  Id. at 207. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id.  Later, the Association lessened the penalty to “70 percent of the 
original suspension and no loss of eligibility.”  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 212. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 213–14; D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12.3.2.1, at 66. 
 91.  Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 214. 
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beneficiary” of the NCAA’s contractual relationship with 
Oklahoma State.92  It forces an institution to either permit an 
athlete to compete in accordance with a court order and face 
penalties if the order is reversed on appeal, or to prohibit the 
athlete from competing, thereby defying a court order and risking 
a contempt-of-court citation.93 
Thus, the Ohio trial court invalidated both the No-Agent Rule 
and the Restitution Rule and granted Oliver a declaratory 
judgment and a permanent injunction preventing the NCAA from 
declaring him ineligible to compete.94  The NCAA commenced an 
appeal, but before the appeal could be heard, the parties reached a 
settlement whereby the NCAA paid Oliver $750,000 to end the 
litigation, therefore leaving both the No-Agent Rule and the 
Restitution Rule intact.95  In Oliver, then, as in Bloom, the 
appellate court never addressed the legitimacy of the Restitution 
Rule directly, leaving that issue for another case and another day. 
D. The High School Cases 
Because so few cases have considered the NCAA’s Restitution 
Rule directly, it is instructive to examine those cases that have 
addressed analogous rules established by state high school 
athletic associations.  Indeed, because the high school cases have 
addressed restitution directly, they present the arguments for and 
against “restitution” more clearly and completely than do the 
college cases.  Accordingly, the high school cases merit review and 
analysis. 
1. The Cardinal Mooney Case 
At issue in Cardinal Mooney High School v. Michigan High 
School Athletic Ass’n was the validity of Michigan’s Regulation V, 
Section 3D (“Rule 3D”), a restitution rule similar to the NCAA’s.96  
Under this rule, if a high school athlete obtained an injunction 
that was vacated, stayed, or reversed on appeal, the Michigan 
High School Athletic Association (“MHSAA”) could take one or 
 
 92.  Id. at 216. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 206, 218–19. 
 95.  See Brandon D. Morgan, Oliver v. NCAA: NCAA’s No Agent Rule 
Called Out, but Remains Safe, 17 SPORTS L. J. 303, 314 (2010). 
 96.  467 N.W.2d 21, 22 (Mich. 1991). 
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more of the following actions against the athlete’s school: 
(1)—Require that individual or team records and 
performances achieved during the ineligible athlete’s 
participation be vacated or stricken. 
(2)—Require that team victories be forfeited to opponent. 
(3)—Require that team or individual awards earned by 
such ineligible student be returned to the association.97 
The case arose when the MHSAA declared John McClellan, a 
senior basketball player at Cardinal Mooney, ineligible for the 
1987–88 season because his nineteenth birthday had occurred 
before September 1, 1987.98  McClellan challenged the declaration 
of ineligibility in a Michigan trial court and obtained two 
temporary restraining orders, but he ultimately lost the case when 
the trial court determined that the age-eligibility rule applied to 
him.99  Still, the trial court prohibited the MHSAA from 
penalizing McClellan or his school retroactively because he had 
participated, as a second-string player, in a few games while the 
temporary restraining orders were in effect.100  The Michigan 
Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that Rule 3D was “arbitrary, 
unreasonable and unlawful,” and assessed $1,500 in damages 
against both the MHSAA and its counsel for filing a “vexatious” 
appeal.101 
The MHSAA appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which 
first reversed the damage award, observing that because of the 
absence of case law on athletic restitution rules, the matter was 
sufficiently unsettled that a reasonable lawyer could challenge the 
trial court’s ruling in good faith.102  Indeed, the Court explained, 
the MHSAA was entitled to continue challenging the damage 
award in hopes that “this Court would eventually grant leave to 
appeal, as we have now done.”103 
The Michigan Supreme Court also reversed on the merits, 
 
 97.  Id. at 22–23 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 98.  Id. at 23. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 23–24. 
 103.  Id. at 24. 
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finding Rule 3D “to be a valid restitutive provision.”104  In the 
Court’s view, the rule was “reasonably designed to rectify the 
competitive inequities that would inevitably occur if schools were 
permitted without penalty to field ineligible athletes under the 
protection of a temporary restraining order, pending the outcome 
of an ultimately unsuccessful legal challenge to one or more 
eligibility rules.”105  Furthermore, the opinion noted, the rule did 
not interfere with a court order while it was in effect, and the 
member schools in the state association had agreed to abide by it 
as a condition of their membership.106  Thus, according to the 
Michigan Supreme Court, Rule 3D was “a valid regulation which 
neither infringe[d] the authority of the courts nor improperly 
restrict[ed] access to the judicial system.”107  The court therefore 
reversed the trial court and vacated the injunction against 
enforcement of Rule 3D.108 
2. The Reyes Case 
A restitution rule was also at the forefront of the Indiana 
Supreme Court’s decision in Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n v. 
Reyes.109  In Reyes, a high school senior who sought to play 
baseball during the 1994–95 academic year was declared ineligible 
under Indiana’s rule restricting high school athletes to eight 
semesters of competition.110  Reyes was set to exceed the eight-
semester limit because he had first enrolled in the ninth grade in 
the fall of 1990 and had repeated that grade in 1991–92 at a high 
school in Puerto Rico.111  After exhausting his administrative 
options within the state athletic association, he sought injunctive 
relief.112  An Indiana trial court issued a temporary restraining 
order preventing the association from enforcing the eight-semester 
rule against him.113  The trial court subsequently issued a 
permanent injunction against the state athletic association and 
 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 25. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  694 N.E.2d 249 (Ind. 1997). 
 110.  Id. at 252. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 253. 
 113.  Id.  
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prohibited it from penalizing Reyes’s high school for honoring the 
injunction.114 
A panel of the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, and upheld 
both the eight-semester eligibility rule and the state athletic 
association’s restitution rule.115  But in a prior decision, Indiana 
High School Athletic Ass’n v. Avant, a different court of appeals 
panel had invalidated Indiana’s restitution rule,116 so the affected 
high school in Reyes asked the Indiana Supreme Court to resolve 
the apparent conflict between the two court of appeals decisions 
and to adopt the position taken by the panel in Avant.117 
Under Indiana’s restitution rule, which is also similar to the 
NCAA’s, the state athletic association could impose one or more of 
the following sanctions on a school and an athlete if the original 
injunction was stayed or reversed: 
(1) require [that] individual or team records and 
performances achieved during participation by such 
ineligible student be vacated or stricken; 
(2) require [that] team victories be forfeited to 
opponents; 
(3) require [that] team or individual awards earned be 
returned to the state association; and/or 
(4) if the school has received or would receive any funds 
from an Association tournament series in which the 
ineligible individual has participated, require the school 
forfeit its share of net receipts from such competition, and 
if said receipts have not been [distributed], authorize the 
withholding of such [receipts] by the Association.118 
In its analysis, the Indiana Supreme Court acknowledged the 
high school’s argument that the restitution rule showed 
“disrespect” for the judiciary by encouraging school administrators 
to defy court orders.119  But the court rejected that argument, 
stating: 
 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  650 N.E.2d 1164, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 
 117.  Reyes, 694 N.E.2d at 253. 
 118.  Id. at 254, n.3. 
 119.  Id. at 257. 
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If a school wants to enjoy the benefits of membership in 
the IHSAA, the school agrees to be subject to rule that 
permits the IHSAA to require the school to forfeit 
victories, trophies, titles and earnings if a trial court 
improperly grants an injunction or restraining order 
prohibiting enforcement of IHSAA eligibility rules.  Such 
an agreement shows no disrespect to the institution of the 
judiciary.120 
The court then analogized the operation of Indiana’s 
restitution rule to the purchase of professional liability insurance 
by doctors and lawyers to protect themselves from the potentially 
adverse consequences of lawsuits and to the signing by couples of 
prenuptial agreements specifying what will occur if a court finds 
the agreement unenforceable.121  In light of the similarity between 
Indiana’s restitution rule and malpractice insurance or prenuptial 
agreements, the court reasoned that the former showed no 
disrespect to courts.122  Rather, the rule was an acceptable means 
by which the members of the state athletic association chose to 
balance one team’s interest in complying with a court order and 
another team’s interest in not having to compete against an 
opponent using an ineligible player because a local trial court 
prohibited a high school association from enforcing its eligibility 
rules.123  Thus, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the decision 
of the Court of Appeals in Reyes and overturned Avant to the 
extent that decision had invalidated the state athletic 
association’s restitution rule.124 
3. The Carlberg Case 
On the same day that the Indiana Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Reyes, it also issued a decision in the companion case, 
Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n v. Carlberg.125  In Carlberg, a 
trial court ordered the same state athletic association to permit a 
transfer student to participate on the swim team of the transferee 
high school and enjoined the enforcement of a restitution rule 
 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 258. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  694 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 1997). 
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against the athlete or his school.126  The state athletic association 
appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed.127  It 
reasoned that the association’s transfer rule, which prohibited 
varsity (but not junior varsity or freshman) participation by a 
transfer student for one year post-transfer unless a parental 
change of address accompanied the transfer, violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.128 
The state athletic association appealed to the Indiana 
Supreme Court, which reversed, upholding the transfer rule 
because it was rationally related to the goal of preventing “school 
jumping” for athletic purposes.129  The majority noted that a 
rational basis test applies to an equal protection challenge to state 
action when, as in this case, no constitutional right is at stake and 
no suspect classification has been created.130  Regarding the trial 
court’s order prohibiting enforcement of Indiana’s restitution rule, 
the Carlberg majority cited and adopted the reasoning used by the 
Michigan Supreme Court in the Cardinal Mooney case discussed 
earlier.131  According to the Carlberg majority, the rule was 
reasonably designed to rectify competitive inequities that would 
result if schools could field teams with ineligible athletes, subject 
to a favorable court order, pending the outcome of an ultimately 
unsuccessful legal challenge to an eligibility rule.132 
For present purposes, though, the importance of Carlberg lies 
in the dissent penned by Justice Brent Dickson, specifically that 
portion concerning Indiana’s restitution rule.  In Justice Dickson’s 
view, although the rule might well protect the interests of athletes 
who competed against a team with an ineligible player, “it wholly 
fails to protect the interests of an equally innocent set of actors: 
those teammates with whom the student participated and the 
schools they represented.”133  He added that when, as in this case, 
a trial court issues an order enjoining a state athletic association 
from prohibiting an athlete’s participation, “neither the ineligible 
 
 126.  Id. at 227. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 236 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. (citing Cardinal Mooney High Sch. v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic 
Ass’n., 467 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Mich. 1991)). 
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id. at 245 (Dickson, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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player’s teammates nor his school are free to ignore [the] court 
order.”134  Therefore, Justice Dickson concluded, to punish that 
player’s teammates and school “is manifestly arbitrary and 
capricious.”135  Moreover, to do so in an individual sport, like 
swimming, is nonsensical because the ineligible athlete’s times or 
scores can be easily deducted from team totals to determine 
whether the team would have qualified for the honors it earned 
even without the ineligible player’s contribution.136 
E. The Limits of Restitution 
The above review of litigation concerning the NCAA’s 
Restitution Rule and its analogs in the high school context reveals 
that, although arguments can be made in support of this type of 
rule, its inequities are sufficiently severe to warrant a search for 
alternatives.  After all, to achieve its aim of preventing 
institutions from using ineligible players, the NCAA’s Restitution 
Rule: (1) discourages athletes from pursuing legal remedies, (2) 
punishes institutions that honor court-ordered injunctions, 
thereby encouraging them to flout such injunctions, and (3) 
penalizes the innocent teammates of the litigant whose institution 
honors an injunction.137 
But any effort to identify and adopt an alternative to the 
Restitution Rule must take into account American courts’ historic 
deference to the right of private associations to manage their 
affairs as they see fit.  That deference is the subject of Part III, 
which follows. 
 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 245–46. 
 137.  Furthermore, a recent academic commentary characterizes the 
Restitution Rule as a “waiver of recourse” clause that “does not preclude 
access to the courts on its face, [but] effectively stops member institutions 
from honoring and enforcing valid court orders and injunctions.”  See Ross et 
al., supra note 16, at 96.  Such clauses in contracts have generally been held 
to violate public policy; hence, they rarely exist absent an agreement to 
arbitrate.  See id. at 97-98 (citing Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 
527, 544 n.61 (7th Cir. 1978)). 
PORTOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2015  2:16 PM 
2015] NCAA’S RESTITUTION RULE 359 
III. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS 
A. Deference and Restitution 
The NCAA, like other private associations, enjoys 
considerable deference from courts when enforcing its rules and 
regulations.  Several cases illustrate this judicial deference at 
work.  In NCAA v. Brinkworth, a Florida appellate court reversed 
a trial court order temporarily enjoining the NCAA from enforcing 
its decision declaring Brinkworth ineligible to play football for the 
University of Miami (“Miami”) during the 1996 season.138  
Brinkworth had enrolled at Miami in 1991; so in the NCAA’s eyes, 
he had exhausted his collegiate eligibility (four years of 
competition within a five-year period) at the end of the 1995 
season.139  Still, he sought to play in 1996 because he had been 
injured in the first game of 1995 and was forced to sit out the rest 
of that season.140 
In rejecting Brinkworth’s claim for a waiver of the five-year 
rule, the appellate court observed that “a court may intervene in 
the internal affairs of a private association only in exceptional 
circumstances.”141  Those circumstances occur when: (1) the 
association’s action adversely affects substantial property, 
contract, or other economic rights, and the association’s own 
procedures were inadequate or unfair, or (2) the association acted 
maliciously or in bad faith.142  In this case, the appellate court 
concluded that it was not required to decide whether the NCAA’s 
decision had adversely affected Brinkworth’s economic rights 
because Brinkworth had failed to show that those procedures were 
inadequate or unfair.143  He had sought a waiver of the five-year 
eligibility rule; Miami had submitted the waiver request on his 
 
 138.  680 So. 2d 1081, 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).   
 139.  Id. at 1082.  See D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12.8.1, at 75 (“A 
student-athlete shall complete his or her seasons of participation within five 
calendar years from the beginning of the semester or quarter in which the 
student-athlete first registered for a minimum full-time program of studies in 
a collegiate institution . . .”). 
 140.  Brinkworth, 680 So. 2d at 1082. 
 141.  Id. at 1084 (emphasis added). 
 142.  Id. (quoting Rewolinski v. Fisher, 444 So. 2d 54, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 143.  Id. at 1082. 
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behalf to the NCAA’s eligibility staff, which had denied it.144  
Thereafter, he appealed to the Eligibility Committee, which 
affirmed the denial.145  The court acknowledged that Brinkworth 
challenged the Committee’s reliance on its 1991 waiver rule, 
which was in effect when he enrolled in college, instead of its 1994 
waiver rule, but concluded that the responsibility for interpreting 
NCAA rules rests with the NCAA itself, not with the judiciary.146  
“As the procedures were adequate and fair,” the court wrote, 
“there was no basis on which to intervene in the internal affairs of 
the NCAA.”147 
Similarly, in Hispanic College Fund, Inc. v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the court upheld an NCAA decision 
denying the Hispanic College Fund’s (“HCF”) request for a waiver 
allowing it to sponsor a college football game that would be 
exempt from the Association’s rule limiting member institutions to 
playing twelve games per season.148  The appellate court affirmed 
the trial court’s ruling that it could not interfere with the NCAA’s 
decision “[a]bsent fraud, other illegality, or abuse of civil or 
property rights having their origin elsewhere.”149  “The HCF 
voluntarily subjected itself to the NCAA’s decision making 
process,” the court continued, “and does not allege the NCAA’s 
actions were fraudulent, otherwise illegal, or that they abused 
civil or property rights having their origin elsewhere.”150  
Therefore, the court declined “HCF’s invitation to interfere in the 
NCAA’s internal affairs” and upheld an Association rule 
establishing which organizations could sponsor early-season 
games that were exempt from the cap on the number of football 
games a member institution could play per season.151 
In NCAA v. Lasege, alluded to earlier, in which the trial court 
had granted a Nigerian basketball player an injunction permitting 
him to compete for the University of Louisville, the Kentucky 
 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 1084 (citing Rewolinski, 444 So. 2d at 58). 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  826 N.E.2d 652, 654 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).  See D-1 MANUAL, supra 
note 3, art. 17.9.5.1, at 253. 
 149.  Brinkworth, 680 So. 2d at 655 (citing Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. 
Reyes, 694 N.E.2d 249, 256 (Ind. 1997)). 
 150.  Id. at 658. 
 151.  Id. 
PORTOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2015  2:16 PM 
2015] NCAA’S RESTITUTION RULE 361 
Supreme Court granted the NCAA interlocutory relief from the 
injunction.152  The justices reasoned that the trial court had 
“wrongfully substituted its judgment for that of the NCAA after it 
analyzed the evidence and reached a different conclusion as to 
Lasege’s intent to professionalize”—by previously accepting 
various benefits in return for playing basketball in Russia.153  
They added that the NCAA’s decision denying eligibility was not 
“arbitrary and capricious,” as the trial court had ruled, because 
that decision “ha[d] strong evidentiary support—Lasege 
unquestionably signed contracts to play professional basketball 
and unquestionably accepted benefits.”154 
Finally, in McAdoo v. University of North Carolina, the court 
rejected football player Michael McAdoo’s challenge to a 
November 2010 decision by the NCAA’s Reinstatement 
Committee, which declared him permanently ineligible for 
collegiate competition for committing academic fraud and 
receiving extra benefits after he received impermissible assistance 
from a former tutor on multiple assignments over the course of 
several academic terms.155 
In that case, a North Carolina appellate court noted, “[i]t is 
well established that courts will not interfere with the internal 
affairs of voluntary associations.”156  Accordingly, when a plaintiff 
challenges a private association’s decision, a court will dismiss the 
case as non-justiciable unless the plaintiff alleges facts showing 
that: (1) the decision violated due process, or (2) the association 
engaged in arbitrary behavior, fraud, or collusion.157  The court 
then determined that McAdoo lacked standing because the injury 
he allegedly suffered with respect to his professional football 
prospects was speculative.158  More precisely, it was unclear that 
his loss of college eligibility for academic reasons had caused him 
 
 152.  53 S.W.3d 77, 80, 84 (Ky. 2001). 
 153.  Id. at 81, 85. 
 154.  Id. at 85. 
 155.  736 S.E.2d 811, 814, 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). 
 156.  Id. at 825 (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson Realty & Constr., 
Inc. v. Asheboro-Randolph Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 518 S.E.2d 28, 30 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1999) (citing 6 AM. JUR. 2D Association and Clubs § 37 (1963)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 157.  Id  (quoting Topp v. Big Rock Found., Inc., 726 S.E.2d 884, 889 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2012)).  This set of factors is known as the Topp test.  Id. 
 158.  Id. at 823. 
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to not be selected in the National Football League draft, thereby 
forcing him to sign a free-agent contract for a lesser amount than 
he would have received if drafted.159  Moreover, because he had 
signed a contract with the Baltimore Ravens, his claim seeking 
reinstatement of collegiate eligibility had become moot.160  The 
appellate court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s order 
dismissing the case.161 
B. Deference Denied 
Nevertheless, judicial deference to private associations in 
general and the NCAA in particular is not an impregnable 
fortress; indeed, courts have breached its defenses in several cases 
involving collegiate sports.  For example, in Gulf South Conference 
v. Boyd, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a trial court order 
declaring Boyd eligible to play football because his athletic 
conference had violated its own rules in declaring him 
ineligible.162  Boyd had played football on scholarship as a 
freshman at Livingston University.163  Declining an offer of 
renewal for his sophomore year, he transferred to a junior college 
instead, where he later graduated but did not play football.164  
When he tried to enroll for his junior year and play football at 
Troy State University, which, like Livingston, belonged to the Gulf 
South Conference, the conference office declared him ineligible.165 
In affirming the trial court, the Alabama Supreme Court 
stated boldly: 
We hold that the general non-interference doctrine 
concerning voluntary associations does not apply to cases 
involving disputes between college athletes themselves 
and college athletic associations. . . .  In such cases the 
athlete himself is not even a member of the athletic 
association; therefore, the basic “freedom of association” 
principle behind the non-interference rule is not present.  
The athlete himself has no voice or bargaining power 
 
 159.  Id.  
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 826. 
 162.  369 So. 2d 553, 554 (Ala. 1979). 
 163.  Id. at 555. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
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concerning the rules and regulations adopted by the 
athletic associations because he is not a member, yet he 
stands to be substantially affected, and even damaged, by 
an association ruling declaring him to be ineligible to 
participate in intercollegiate athletics.166 
Having freed itself from the traditional deference to private 
associations, the court proceeded to examine the rule under which 
the conference had declared Boyd ineligible and concluded that 
the conference had violated its own rule.167  The rule provided 
that if a member school declined to renew an athlete’s scholarship 
or offered a renewal, but the athlete declined, the athlete was 
permitted to accept an offer from another conference member.168  
Moreover, a separate conference rule granted eligibility to an 
athlete who declined a scholarship at one member school, did not 
compete for two years, and then accepted a scholarship offer from 
another member school.169  Because Boyd qualified under both 
rules, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the conference had 
violated its own rules in declaring him ineligible.170 
The court in California State University, Hayward v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n did not find a blanket exception to the 
traditional rule of judicial deference in all cases featuring athletes 
and college athletic associations.171  Still, the Hayward court 
echoed the Boyd court in holding that courts should intervene in 
the affairs of a private association when the latter violates its own 
rules.172  The Hayward case concerned the NCAA’s former “1.6 
rule,” which barred from athletic competition any freshman whose 
institution could not predict, based on the athlete’s high school 
grade-point average and standardized test (SAT or ACT) score, 
that he or she would earn at least a 1.6 grade-point average.173  
The period of ineligibility would end when the athlete earned at 
least a 2.0 grade-point average for ten hours of college credit.174 
 
 166.  Id. at 557. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. at 557–58. 
 169.  Id. at 558. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  47 Cal. App. 3d 533, 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). 
 172.  Id. at 543; see also Boyd, 369 So. 2d at 557. 
 173.  Hayward, 47 Cal. App. 3d at 538. 
 174.  Id. 
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Two such athletes, a runner and a baseball player, were 
ineligible for competition at California State University-Hayward 
(“CSUH”) as first-semester freshmen (in the fall of 1969 and 1970, 
respectively), but the University permitted them to compete in the 
spring semester after they each earned at least a 2.0 average 
during the fall term.175 CSUH interpreted the 1.6 rule to apply to 
postseason competition only, thereby permitting a freshman “sub-
predictor” to compete during the regular season so long as he or 
she was not allowed to compete in postseason events.176  The Far 
West Conference, to which CSUH belonged, also interpreted the 
rule that way, relying on a 1969 letter from the NCAA to the 
commissioner of the conference.177  Consequently, CSUH was 
unaware that its runner and baseball player had eligibility 
problems until the NCAA published a memo in November 1972 
stating that “sub-predictors” were ineligible for both regular-
season and postseason competition.178 
When the NCAA directed CSUH to declare the two athletes 
ineligible, CSUH chose not to do so.179  Instead, CSUH appealed 
on their behalf to the NCAA, which retaliated against the 
University for defying it and taking up the athletes’ cause by 
declaring all CSUH athletes ineligible for postseason competition 
indefinitely.180  CSUH obtained a preliminary injunction barring 
the NCAA from enforcing its blanket declaration of postseason 
ineligibility.181  On appeal by the NCAA, a California appellate 
court affirmed, reasoning that CSUH was entitled to a 
preliminary injunction so that the parties could litigate the 
question whether the NCAA’s decision violated its own 
constitution and bylaws.182  The appellate court observed that 
courts will intervene in the internal affairs of a private association 
when the association’s action is either contrary to its rules or not 
authorized by its bylaws.183 
 
 175.  Id. at 539. 
 176.  See Trs. of Cal. State Univs. & Colls. v. NCAA, 82 Cal. App. 3d 461, 
467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 469. 
 179.  Hayward, 47 Cal. App. 3d at 539. 
 180.  Id. at 537. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. at 540. 
 183.  Id. at 539. 
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Later, after a trial on the merits, the trial court issued a 
permanent injunction in favor of CSUH, from which the NCAA 
appealed.184  The appellate court affirmed.185  Like CSUH, the 
appellate court interpreted the 1.6 rule to apply only to the 
eligibility of institutions for postseason competition, not to that of 
individual athletes for regular-season competition.186  The 
appellate court construed the pertinent bylaw’s reference to 
ineligibility for participation “in an NCAA-sponsored event” to 
mean a postseason championship event, not a regular-season 
contest.187  Thus, the appellate court concluded, the runner and 
the baseball player had been eligible to compete for CSUH under 
NCAA standards beginning in the spring semester of each one’s 
freshman year in college, and CSUH did not violate an NCAA rule 
in permitting them to do so.188  The permanent injunction would 
stand because the NCAA had misread and misapplied its own 
rule.189 
C. Lessons for the Future 
The import of the above cases for anyone contemplating a 
challenge to the NCAA’s Restitution Rule is that, unless the 
plaintiff can show that the Association’s action was illegal, 
contrary to its own rules, or adverse to substantial economic 
rights, courts will defer to its right to regulate its members’ 
athletic programs.  Nevertheless, commentators have advocated 
several methods of defanging the Restitution Rule, each of which 
Part IV will identify before concluding that binding arbitration is 
the best means to that end. 
IV. ARBITRATION INSTEAD OF RESTITUTION 
A. A Menu of Alternatives 
The Restitution Rule’s harsh penalties and its tendency to 
discourage athletes from seeking and institutions from honoring 
 
 184.  Trs. of Cal. State Univs. & Colls. v. NCAA, 82 Cal. App. 3d 461, 465 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
 185.  Id. at 476. 
 186.  Id. at 474–75. 
 187.  Id. at 474. 
 188.  Id. at 475. 
 189.  Id. at 475–76. 
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injunctions have spawned several suggestions for replacing it or, 
at least, blunting its impact.  Most of those suggestions would 
require courts to change the standards by which they judge 
disputes between the NCAA and college athletes. 
One suggestion is that in such cases, courts should abandon 
their traditional deference to the rights of private associations to 
govern themselves because that rationale fails when applied to 
college athletes, who are not members of the NCAA.190  This 
reasoning echoes that of the Alabama Supreme Court in the Boyd 
case, in which the court held: 
[T]he general non-interference doctrine concerning 
voluntary associations does not apply to cases involving 
disputes between college athletes themselves and college 
athletic associations . . . [because] the athlete himself is 
not even a member of the athletic association [a 
conference in this instance] . . . [and] has no voice or 
bargaining power concerning [its] rules and 
regulations.191 
Like the Boyd opinion, commentary advocating the end of judicial 
deference to the NCAA argues that the associational-autonomy 
rationale for such deference “is a red herring in the context of the 
NCAA and student-athletes, as the rule of deference applies to 
members, which the student-athletes are not.”192 
This suggestion, if adopted, would leave the Restitution Rule 
in place, but could reduce the likelihood of appellate court 
reversals of injunctions favoring athletes, thereby limiting the 
NCAA’s opportunities to invoke the rule.  Without the deference 
rationale, appellate courts would presumably be more likely to 
affirm injunctions favoring athletes, thereby preventing the NCAA 
from employing the Restitution Rule. 
An alternative suggestion would eliminate the Restitution 
Rule on the ground that it “[r]enders the court system 
meaningless,” replacing it with heavy penalties (e.g., fines, 
scholarship reductions, bans on postseason competition, 
 
 190.  See T. Matthew Lockhart, Oliver v. NCAA: Throwing a Contractual 
Curveball at the NCAA’s ‘Veil of Amateurism,’ 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 175, 187 
(2010). 
 191.  Gulf S. Conference v. Boyd, 369 So. 2d 553, 557 (Ala. 1979). 
 192.  Lockhart, supra note 190, at 187. 
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suspensions of coaches, etc.) for institutions that use ineligible 
players repeatedly.193  Still another suggestion is for courts “to 
punish the NCAA until it directs members to follow the court’s 
order.”194  According to this view, “[t]he NCAA could easily adopt 
a simple rule that all members are required to follow valid court 
orders issued against the NCAA.”195 
Each of these suggestions is problematic.  Presumably, courts 
will not uniformly abandon their traditional deference to the 
NCAA in its relations with college athletes anytime soon.  Even if 
some courts were to do so, others would not, leaving injunctions 
more vulnerable to reversal and athletes more vulnerable to 
imposition of the Restitution Rule in some jurisdictions than in 
others.  And even absent judicial deference to the NCAA, an 
appellate court could still reverse an injunction in a particular 
case, thereby triggering imposition of the Restitution Rule.  
Eliminating the Restitution Rule and substituting major penalties 
for repeat institutional offenders is flawed too.  By the time the 
penalties are imposed, the ineligible athlete may well have 
graduated or exhausted eligibility, and the perhaps complicit 
coach may have moved on as well, leaving innocent successors to 
bear the burdens of the penalties.  Finally, the NCAA, which has 
not needed to invoke the Restitution Rule since 1976, is unlikely 
to mothball its nuclear weapon by ordering its members to honor 
court orders adverse to the Association. 
B. The Best Choice:  Binding Arbitration 
Fortunately, a better substitute exists for the Restitution 
Rule, one that will be less punitive to athletes and institutions 
while serving the NCAA’s legitimate goal of discouraging its 
members from using ineligible athletes in competition.  The 
proper substitute for the Restitution Rule is binding arbitration 
conducted by professional arbitrators independent of the NCAA, 
in the manner of professional sports leagues and the United 
States Olympic Committee (“USOC”).196 
Binding arbitration has several advantages over the NCAA’s 
 
 193.  Morgan, supra note 95, at 313. 
 194.  Johnson, supra note 16, at 507. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  See Ross et al., supra note 16, at 82. 
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current reinstatement procedure, potentially followed by a claim 
for injunctive relief.  First, arbitrators, unlike members of the 
Reinstatement Committee, would be independent of the NCAA.  
Members of the Reinstatement Committee owe their positions to 
the NCAA, and athletes cannot participate in the appointment or 
the removal of members, who serve three-year terms.197  In 
contrast, under an arbitration scheme, the athlete and the NCAA, 
as the parties, could consult with a case manager employed by the 
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) to identify the qualities 
they desired in an arbitrator.198  The case manager would use the 
information provided by the parties to compile a list of candidates, 
from which the parties could either agree on a person or rank the 
candidates to whom they did not object and then let the case 
manager select the highest ranked candidate.199 
Second, binding arbitration produces a result more quickly 
than litigation can, which is why it is available with respect to the 
time-sensitive eligibility and selection decisions that sports 
governing bodies must make regarding Olympic athletes.200  In 
the collegiate context, as in the Olympic setting, time is often of 
the essence concerning eligibility determinations; hence 
arbitration would be preferable to litigation in collegiate sports 
too.201  In Olympic sports, the Ted Stevens Amateur Sports Act,202 
enacted in 1978 and significantly amended in 1998, gives athletes 
a statutory right to submit eligibility disputes to the AAA, which 
results in independent, impartial review and a final decision that 
is binding on the parties.203 
 
 197.  See id. at 107 (citing NCAA, 2012–13 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 
21.7.7.3, at 364 (2012)). 
 198.  See id. at 113. 
 199.  See id.  
 200.  See id. at 109. 
 201.  See id. 
 202.  36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–220529 (2012). 
 203.  See id. § 220529; Ross et al., supra note 16, at 111.  Independent of 
the Amateur Sports Act, since 1996, the International Olympic Committee 
has required athletes wishing to compete in the Olympics to sign a waiver 
form agreeing to bring all disputes before the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(“CAS”) and forego lawsuits.  See Jason Gubi, Note, The Olympic Binding 
Arbitration Clause and the Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Analysis of Due 
Process Concerns, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 997, 998 
(2008).  The form states: “The decisions of CAS shall be final, non-appealable 
and enforceable.  I shall not institute any claim, arbitration or litigation, or 
seek any other form of relief in any other court or tribunal.”  Melissa R. 
PORTOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2015  2:16 PM 
2015] NCAA’S RESTITUTION RULE 369 
USOC Bylaw 9.7 also guarantees athletes whose claims 
against sports governing bodies are not resolved to the athletes’ 
satisfaction access to binding arbitration.204  Another USOC 
bylaw, 9.9, provides for expedited arbitration; when a competition 
is fast approaching and a decision can not be reached in time 
under the customary procedure, expedited arbitration produces a 
decision within forty-eight hours of the claim having been filed.205  
In such expedited reviews, the arbitrators are authorized to hear 
and decide the claims under such procedures as are necessary but 
still fair to the parties.206  Indeed, the main difference between 
the binding arbitration provisions in the USOC bylaws and those 
in the Amateur Sports Act is that the former apply to all disputes 
brought by claimants, whereas the latter apply only to disputes 
arising within twenty-one days of the start of an international 
competition.207 
Third, arbitration is generally less expensive, more private, 
and more likely than litigation to feature a decision maker with 
deep knowledge of the particular issues in question.208  In the 
latter connection, all of the arbitrators employed by the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”), which considers eligibility disputes 
concerning the Olympics, the Paralympics, and the Pan American 
Games, are not only trained lawyers, but also persons with deep 
 
Bitting, Comment, Mandatory Binding Arbitration for Olympic Athletes: Is 
the Process Better or Worse for ‘Job Security’?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 655, 663 
(1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 204.  U.S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, BYLAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OLYMPIC 
COMMITTEE § 9.7, at 40 (2014), available at http://www.teamusa.org/ 
Footer/Legal/Governance-Documents. 
 205.  Id. § 9.9, at 40. 
 206.  See id. 
 207.  Compare 36 U.S.C. § 220509(a) (“In any lawsuit relating to the 
resolution of a dispute involving the opportunity of an amateur athlete to 
participate in the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, or the Pan-
American Games, a court shall not grant injunctive relief against the 
corporation within 21 days before the beginning of such games if the 
corporation, after consultation with the chair of the Athlete’s Advisory 
Council, has provided a sworn statement in writing executed by an officer of 
the corporation to such court that its constitution and bylaws cannot provide 
for the resolution of such dispute prior to the beginning of such games.”), with 
U.S. OLYMPIC COMM. BYLAWS § 9.7, at 40.  See also Bitting, supra note 203, at 
663 (quoting Stephen A. Kaufman, Note, Issues in International Sports 
Arbitration, 13 B.U. INT’L L. J. 527, 532 (1995)); Gubi, supra note 203, at 
1022.  
 208.  See Ross et al., supra note 16, at 112. 
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experience in sports.209 
Finally and most importantly, if binding arbitration were to 
replace the NCAA’s current reinstatement process, athletes would 
not seek injunctions to restore their eligibility because the 
arbitrator’s decision would be final.  Therefore, the Restitution 
Rule would no longer be necessary to protect the Association’s 
legitimate interest in discouraging its members from using 
ineligible athletes.210  At the same time, athletes challenging an 
NCAA declaration of ineligibility would know that the arbitrators 
in their respective cases were entirely independent of the NCAA. 
C. Arbitration in Action 
Ideally, the NCAA would amend its bylaws to replace its 
current athlete reinstatement process with an arbitration 
mechanism.211  If the NCAA resists this change, Congress ought 
to require it, perhaps as a condition precedent to conferring on the 
Association a limited antitrust exemption.212  The exemption 
would empower the NCAA to rein in the commercial excess of 
major college sports without risking lawsuits from member 
institutions or media outlets.213 
 
 209.  See Bitting, supra note 203, at 673.  
 210.  See Ross et al., supra note 16, at 113. 
 211.  See id. at 112. 
 212.  In recent years, several commentators have suggested that Congress 
confer a limited antitrust exemption on the NCAA in exchange for requiring 
the Association to enact reforms that would strengthen the link between 
athletics and higher education.  See generally PORTO, supra note 2 (discussing 
the impact of two cases, National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents 
of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) and National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), on the NCAA and collegiate 
sports and proposing that congressional action be taken in order to ensure 
the fairness and educational soundness of the administration of college 
sports). 
 213.  See generally Matthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory 
Solution to Better Promote the Educational Values and Economic 
Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 ORE. L. REV. 837, 857 (2014) 
(arguing that, as opposed to other alternatives, reform of commercialized 
collegiate athletics should focus on “creat[ing] programs designed to ensure 
that student-athletes participating in big-time sports receive the fullest 
opportunity to gain the benefits a college education can offer,” and the best 
way to accomplish this is through an external regulatory commission); C. 
Thomas McMillen, Could the Government End the Mess in College Sports?, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (August 15, 2014), http://chronicle.com/ 
article/Could-the-Government-End-the/148407/ (arguing that a congressional 
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Regardless of how arbitration is applied to NCAA eligibility 
disputes, the NCAA can use the arbitration provided for in the 
Amateur Sports Act as a model.214  The Act authorizes arbitration 
for athletes, coaches, trainers, managers, and officials215 whose 
complaints against national sport governing bodies the USOC has 
decided in favor of the governing bodies.216  The NCAA could 
restrict arbitration to athletes whose institutions have declared 
them ineligible for competition.  The Act specifies that a party 
seeking arbitration must submit its request within thirty days of 
the USOC’s decision.217  No such timetable presently exists for 
colleges and universities to seek reinstatement of athletes, but 
under an arbitration model, the NCAA could establish a period of 
time after the declaration of ineligibility for submitting an 
arbitration request.218  Under the Amateur Sports Act, when the 
AAA receives a demand for arbitration, the pertinent regional 
office notifies the complainant, the sports governing body 
involved, and the USOC.219  Similarly, a college athlete contesting 
an eligibility decision could file a request for arbitration with the 
AAA, which would then be required to notify the athlete, the 
institution, and the NCAA that it had received the filing. 
The Amateur Sports Act provides for three arbitrators per 
hearing, unless the parties agree to fewer,220 to be held at a site 
the AAA selects, unless the parties agree to a different site.221  
These provisions would work well in the college sports context too 
because they insure that the majority view of a panel prevails, 
 
grant of an antitrust exemption to the NCAA would allow the Association to 
rein in rampant spending and commercialism in college athletics in favor of 
restoring academic integrity).  
 214.  See 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a) (2012). 
 215.  Id. § 220505(c)(5). 
 216.  Id. § 220529(a). 
 217.  Id. § 220529(b)(1). 
 218.  See D-1 MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12.12.2, at 85–86 (“Any appeal to 
restore a student athlete’s eligibility shall be submitted in the name of the 
institution by the president or chancellor (or an individual designated by the 
president or chancellor), faculty athletics representative, senior woman 
administrator or athletics director.”); see supra text accompanying note 29 
(explaining why the absence of a timetable for eligibility disputes is 
inconvenient in the context of college athletics). 
 219.  36 U.S.C. § 220529(a). 
 220.  Id. § 220529(b)(2)(a). 
 221.  Id. § 220529(b)(2)(B). 
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rather than one person’s view, and that neither party enjoys a 
“home court advantage.”  The Act also opens hearings to the 
public.222  This requirement could be problematic in the collegiate 
context, where the athletes are often still in their teens; sensitive 
personal information can be involved, and public interest can be 
intense.223  Accordingly, an arbitration hearing for a college 
athlete should be closed to the public if the athlete so requests.  
The Act provides that each party may have counsel present at the 
hearing, which should apply in collegiate arbitration hearings 
too.224 
The Amateur Sports Act further provides that the arbitrators 
may settle the dispute before making a final award, so long as the 
parties agree and the settlement is consistent with the USOC’s 
constitution and bylaws.225  This provision may seem unnecessary 
in the collegiate context, where one party seeks an immediate 
return to eligibility and the other favors continued ineligibility.  
But in cases featuring a significant violation of NCAA rules, with 
mitigating circumstances, both the athlete and the NCAA might 
agree to a reduced period of ineligibility.  Therefore, a settlement 
option should exist in collegiate arbitration, just as it does in 
Olympic arbitration. 
Under the Amateur Sports Act, the arbitrators’ final decision 
is binding on the parties, provided that decision is consistent with 
the constitution and bylaws of the USOC.226  At any time before a 
final decision is made, the hearing may be reopened, either by the 
arbitrators, on their own motion, or on the motion of a party.227  If 
a party’s motion prompts the reopening, and if that reopening 
would result in the arbitrators’ decision being delayed beyond the 
deadline agreed to at the start of the proceedings, all parties to the 
decision must agree to reopen the hearing.228  Comparable 
provisions would be advisable in the collegiate context, especially 
one that renders the arbitrators’ decision binding so long as it does 
 
 222.  Id. § 220529(b)(2)(C). 
 223.  See Ross et al., supra note 16, at 112 (addressing the personal nature 
of issues often involved in eligibility disputes and the impact of such issues 
on lives of young athletes). 
 224.  36 U.S.C § 220529(b)(4). 
 225.  Id. § 220529(c). 
 226.  Id. § 220529(d). 
 227.  Id. § 220529(e)(1). 
 228.  Id. § 220529(e)(2). 
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not violate the constitution and bylaws of the NCAA or is not void 
as against public policy, such as by violating federal law.  Those 
two provisos would be the only permissible bases for challenging 
the arbitrators’ decision in court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The NCAA’s Bylaw 19.13, the Restitution Rule, is a punitive 
relic of a paternalistic past in college sports, and it should give 
way to binding arbitration, either at the NCAA’s own initiative or 
at Congress’s insistence.  By subjecting individuals and 
institutions to retroactive punishment when an athlete’s 
successful claim for an injunction is reversed on appeal, the 
Restitution Rule discourages athletes from pursuing legal relief 
and institutions from honoring court-ordered injunctions.  It also 
potentially subjects an institution that honors an injunction, along 
with the plaintiff athlete’s innocent teammates, to severe and 
wholly undeserved retribution. 
Several alternatives to the Restitution Rule exist, the best of 
which is binding arbitration of athletic eligibility disputes using 
the model provided by Olympic arbitration.  Binding arbitration is 
the best substitute because it would remove the prospect of 
retroactive penalties by virtually eliminating the need for 
injunctive relief in eligibility cases, while also protecting the 
NCAA’s legitimate interest in barring ineligible athletes from 
competition.  Only by replacing the Restitution Rule with binding 
arbitration can the NCAA punish the guilty, while protecting the 
innocent, and respecting the American legal system. 
 
